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Genetics, Genetic Testing, and
the Specter of Discrimination:
A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases*
BY RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD**
AND RONALD G. CADLE***
ITiRODUCrION
M ost lawyers and law teachers have a limited scientific
background. They are, for the most part, pre-Copemicans. If
a lawyer has any knowledge of genetics it consists of some vague
memory from high school biology, having something to do with fruit flies
(the pesky drosophila) or with brother Mendel's smooth and wrinkled
peas. Still, genetic experiments have been with us since the beginning.
Consider Chapters 30 and 31 of Genesis:'
Jacob said unto Laban [Jacob's Father-in-Law and Master], "Send me
away, that I may go unto mine own place, and to my country.
* A version of this Article was presented during a teaching workshop at the
Medical Institute for Law Faculty held June 5-14, 1996, in Cleveland, Ohio. The
workshop was sponsored by the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the
Cleveland Clinic Foundation.
** Spears-GilbertProfessor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, The Ohio State University. Professor Underwood teaches
a course in Law and Medicine at the University of Kentucky. He is a co-author
of TRIAL ETHIcs (1988) and MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK (1996). Professor Underwood is the Chairman of the
Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics and Unauthorized Practice Committees. He
began teaching a class in Law and Medicine at the University of Kentucky in
1985. He is a contributor to Emery Wilson, M.D. and L. Reed Polk, M. Div.,
PROFESSIONAL AND PRAcTIcE DEVELOPMENT (1990).
*** M.S., DepartmentofPediatrics, Division ofGeneticsandDysmorphology
University of Kentucky College of Medicine. See infra note 9.
' The principal author is a Sunday school drop-out who was tipped to the
story by a secondary source. See LARRY GONICK & MARK WHEELIS, THE
CARTOON GUIDE TO GENETICS 9-10 (1991).
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... [L]et me go; for thou knowest my service which I have done
thee."
And Laban said unto him.. . "tarry.
... Appoint me thy wages, and I will give it."
... And Jacob said... "if thou wilt do this thing for me, I will
again feed and keep thy flock.
I will pass through all thy flock to day, removing from thence all
the speckled and spotted cattle, and all the brown cattle among the
sheep, and the spotted and speckled among the goats: and of such shall
be my hire.
... [E]very one that is not speckled and spotted among the goats,
and brown among the sheep, that shall be counted stolen with me."
... [In other words, Laban would get all of the solid color animals.
Laban agreed to the deal because he didn't know recessive genes from
blue jeans, and assumed that the solid-colored would produce solid-
colored as long as there was no interbreeding.] And [in an effort to
cheat Jacob once more, Laban] removed that day the he goats that were
ringstraked and spotted, and all the she goats that were speckled and
spotted, and everyone that had some white in it, and all the brown
among the sheep, and gave them into the hand of his sons.
And he set three days' journey betwixt himself and Jacob; and
Jacob fed the rest of Laban's flocks.
And Jacob took him rods of green poplar, and of the hazel and
chestnut tree; and pilled white strakes in them, and made the white
appear which was in the rods.
And he set the rods which he had pilled before the flocks in the
gutters in the watering troughs when the flocks came to drink, that they
should conceive when they came to drink.
And the flocks conceived before the rods, and brought forth cattle
ringstraked, speckled and spotted.
And Jacob did separate the lambs, and set the faces of the flocks
toward the ringstraked, and all the brown in the flock of Laban; and he
put away his own flocks by themselves, and put them not unto Laban's
cattle.
And it came to pass, whensoever the stronger cattle did conceive,
that Jacob laid the rods before the eyes of the cattle in the gutters, that
they might conceive among the rods.
But when the cattle were feeble, he put them not in: so the feebler
were Laban's, and the stronger Jacob's.
And the man increased exceedingly, and had much cattle, and
maidservants, and menservants, and camels, and asses.2
2 Genesis 30:25-43 (King James). God had visited Jacob in a dream, and
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Now a "genetic revolution" is upon us. Techniques for genetic testing
have increased in sophistication, and an international effort to map and
sequence human DNA - The Human Genome Project ("HGP")3 - is
now well under way. We are beginning to exploit our new found genetic
knowledge.4 Recognition of the relationship between developments in
genetic science, law, and public policy,5 is creeping into the "literature"6
and into the law school curriculum.7 Even the popular 60 Minutes
had given him the idea, although Jacob had not actually understood what was
going on any more than Laban had.
Martin Pemick suggests that Jacob's notion of what worked was Lamarkian,
the thought being that "specific shocks during conception or pregnancy could
leave recognizably similar 'marks' or 'impressions' on the offspring." MARTIN
S. PERNICK, THE BLACK STORK: EUGENICS AND THE DEATH OF "DEFECTIvE"
BABIES IN AM,,ERICAN MEDICINE AND MOTION PICTURES SINCE 1945, 43 (1996).
3 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The
Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992) (discussing the HGP
and its implications).
4 See Rosemary Orthmann, Human Genome Testing Progresses; Gene
Discoveries Lead to Prospect of Testing, EMPLOYMENT TESTING - L. & POL'Y
REP., Sept. 1995, at 129 (discussing discovery of genes or mutations associated
with different categories of Alzheimer's disease, leukemia (ALL1 gene), breast
and ovarian cancer (BRCA1 gene), kidney cancer (von Hippel-Landau or VHL
gene), and ataxia telangiectasia, a rare and fatal neurological disorder in children
(ATM mutated gene)). For a discussion of recent advances in screening
techniques that can identify germline carriers of the disease genes for familial
adenomatous polyposis ("FAP") and hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer
("HNPCC"), see Susan C. Rossi & Sudhir Srivastava, National Cancer Institute
Workshop on Genetic Screeningfor Colorectal Cancer, J. NAT'L CANCER INST.,
Mar. 20, 1996, at 331, 331-39.
5 See ADVANCES IN GENETIC INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR STATE POLICY
MAKERS - EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, INSURANCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE, GENETIC TESTING, CIVIL LIBERTIES (2d ed. 1993). For international
perspectives, see Dorothy C. Wertz, International Perspectives on Ethics and
Human Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1411 (1993).
6 For an extensive bibliography, see L. Brett Lockwood, Genetics and the
Law, 39 EMORY L.J. 875 (1990). In the authors' neck of the woods, the local
paper ran a five-part, front-page series on the subject of genetic testing. Jim
Warren, Gene Testing: Promise or Peril?, HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.),
Dec. 26, 1995, at Al.
7 See, e.g., Barry Furrow et al., Genetic Screening and Engineering, in
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1014, 1014-33 (2d ed. 1991);
GEORGE SMITH II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD (1993).
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television "news magazine" recently did a program on the perils of genetic
testing.8 Still, for lawyers and policymakers at least, the material is not all
that accessible.
The following Problems were developed by the faculty of the College of
Medicine of the University of Kentucky and were used in a panel presentation
for medical students.9 The discussion that follows each hypothetical is far
from exhaustive, and is offered as a starting point. Readers desiring more
information are directed to the Selected Bibliography."
These Problems present a rather thorough survey of the "issues." They
give the reader some notion of the state-of-the-art in genetic research and its
applications; the Problems also suggest possible implications for confidentiali-
ty, tort liability for disclosure, lawsuits for "wrongful birth" and "wrongful
life," and so on; and they allude to the newsworthy Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA")." Finally, the Problems may motivate the reader
to reflect on other topics, such as euthanasia and eugenics, from another
perspective.
12
B 60 Minutes: Do You Really Want to Know? Pros and Cons of Genetic
Testing (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 21, 1996).
9 The original Problems were assembled by Ron Cadle and were presented
by Jeffrey Davidson (Ph.D. - Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of Kentucky College of Medicine), R. Steven Brown (Director of the
Centers for Health and Environment at The Council of State Governments),
Jennifer Morrow (Ph.D. - University of Kentucky College of Medicine), Anjana
Pettigrew (M.D. - University of Kentucky College of Medicine), and Richard
Underwood (University of Kentucky College of Law). Some of the Problems
were based on cases described in ADVANCES IN GENETIC INFORMATION, supra
note 5, published by the Council of State Governments and compiled by R.
Steven Brown. Ron Cadle is the "co-author" because the Problems were his
creation. He is not responsible for the "answers."
o See infra pp. 695-96.
"Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (1994)). The subject ofAIDS provides another obvious opportunity
for examining the implications of the ADA. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 912
F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995) (dentist liable for discrimination under ADA for
refusing to treat patient with asymptomatic HIV in office), affid, No. 96-1643,
1997 WL 85096 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 1997); Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp. 779 (N.D.
Ohio 1994) (doctor and hospital may be held liable for discrimination under the
ADA for refusing to provide medical treatment to a patient infected with HIV).
But cf Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 WL 631804, at *3-4 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (individual employee physician not liable under ADA for refusing to
treat child suffering from neurofibromatosis).
12 For cautionary tales, Professor Underwood recommends accounts of the
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THE PROBLEMS
Problem #1
Jacob and Rachel go to Medical Clinic for cystic fibrosis ("CF")
DNA carrier testing. No counseling accompanies the testing. Three weeks
later they are told that Rachel is not a carrier, but that Jacob is a carrier.
Rachel's brother recently died from complications of CF. The couple had
assumed that if either were a carrier, it would have been Rachel. They are
relieved because they assume that both parents have to be carriers to
produce a child with CF. That assumption is based on what they heard
on a television program.
Two years later Jacob and Rachel learn that their two-month-old
daughter has CF. They discover that the carrier testing cannot identify all
carriers. Ten to fifteen percent of carriers have one of the CF genes that
currently cannot be tested for, so that a person whose test results are
negative for carrier status cannot be absolutely sure that he or she is a
noncarrier. The testing reduces the risk, but the risk cannot be eliminat-
ed.'3 Jacob and Rachel contact a lawyer and sue the Clinic for five
million dollars.
Comments
Here we have the problem of screening without adequate information
and counseling. This is common when the patient is involved in mass
screening.'4 According to the American Society for Human Genetics
German infatuation with eugenics set forth in Rita L. Marker et al., Euthanasia:
A Historical Overview, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 257, 265-75 (1991);
HENRY FRIEDLANDER, THE ORIGINS OF NAzI GENOCIDE: FROM EUTHANASIA TO
THE FINAL SOLUTION (1995); and in the chilling account of the adventures of an
American "pioneer" in Martin Pemick's newly-released book, PERNICK, supra
note 2.
"3 Scientists have discovered that the CF gene is very long, which means
that there are more places where its message can be altered by mutation. See
James W. Hanson, Impact of Advances in Genetic Technology on Health Care
and Public Policy, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 44-45 (1994).
'" Louis Elsas II, A Clinical Approach to Legal and Ethical Problems in
Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 811, 839 (1990) (discussing a hypothetical in
which an 18-year-old seeks Tay-Sachs testing in a screening sponsored by her
synagogue); see also Orthmann, supra note 4, at 129 (discussing problems caused
by the shortage of adequately trained counselors who are able to discuss the
1996-97]
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("ASHG"), Rachel's brother's history indicates that'the couple should be
tested. One would ordinarily assume that the couple is entitled to full and
accurate disclosure of information.
Now that things have turned out terribly wrong, the couple's lawyer
will presumably argue that if they had known that there was some risk,
they would have prevented a pregnancy or they would have chosen to
abort any pregnancy. Was there negligence? What are the damages? The
lawyer may bring a "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life" claim, or both.'5
If the lawyer does not suggest such claims, may he or she be sued for
malpractice?
One observer states that she is:
worried that we have a generation of primary care providers who don't
necessarily have a very strong background in genetics; who may have
difficulty explaining the testing that's available; and may have difficulty
sitting down with the family to let them know what the test results
mean, and knowing what to do with that information. 6
The testing laboratories can be another source of unhappy returns. Some
labs do not have a very good record for accuracy. 7
In any event, the ripples are about to break on an adjoining lily pad.
accuracy and implications of testing, including the employment and insurance
implications).
"5 For good discussions, see Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix:
Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 Hous. L. REv.
149, 152-61 (1992) (discussing the history and future of wrongful birth and
wrongful life suits); Cheryl L. Becker, Note, Legal Implications of the G-8
Huntington's Disease Genetic Marker, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 273, 282-88
(1988-89) (discussing specific negligence suits involving wrongful birth and
wrongful life claims). For a wrongful birth suit involving CF, see Schroeder v.
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981). For an interesting case involving a wrongful
life claim, see Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J.
1984).
16 Elizabeth J. Thomson, Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the
Human Genome Project, 3 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 55, 60 (1994) (parents
asserted a malpractice claim against their former attorneys who erroneously
informed them that they had no wrongful birth cause of action for their child
born with birth defects).
"7 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 13, at 49; see also Curlender v. Bio-Science
Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Tay-Sachs disease - "wrongful
life" claim against laboratory).
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Problem #2
Jacob's brother Esau lives in another state. He farms and hunts. He
is trained as a police officer and worked as a police officer in nearby
Town for a year, but returned to full-time fanning with his wife
Mahalath. Much of the family income goes to pay for life and health
insurance. Esau's insurer learns about the CF status of Jacob's daughter
from a "national database." The insurer informs Esau that he and his wife
must have carrier testing, at the insurer's expense, or have their coverage
terminated. At first the couple is irritated by the insurer's demand, but
they decide that testing might set their minds at ease. However, testing
reveals that they are both carriers. The insurer then notifies them that
their coverage is terminated because of this "pre-existing condition" that
had not been reported to the insurer at the time the policy was issued.
Esau contacts a lawyer to see if he has any grounds for a lawsuit against
the insurer. The lawyer says there is a "strong case" and agrees to pursue
it on a contingency fee basis.
Comments
The problem is that with genetic tests, you learn something about
people [who] are not present. If I do a test on someone in this room, I
may discover that they have a genetic condition, but this implies that
probably one or both their parents have that same condition or genetic
factor [and] that their brothers are at a high risk for that same condition
or genetic factor as well as their offspring. 8
Esau and his wife have private life and health insurance, and their
insurer has obtained genetic information from the Medical Information
Bureau ("MIB")' 9 or a similar outfit indicating that this couple might
have a CF child some time in the future. One commentator, Carol Lee,
8 Hanson, supra note 13, at 51; see also Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose
Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic Informa-
tion, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1864-69 (1993) (remarking that one person's test
results will have an effect oh other family members, and providing four
hypotheticals illustrating conflicting interests).
9 "The MIB is an unincorporated trade association whose several hundred
members are the largest insurance companies in North America." T.H. Cushing,
Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?, 60 DEF.
CouNs. J. 249, 259 (1993). The MIB maintains a databank of information about
insureds that is used by the member companies for risk classification. Id.
1996-97]
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claims that the MIB "currently does not carry genetic information" and
that insurers may not have any incentive to test as long as no other
insurers test;2" but other commentators allude to case studies that suggest
that insurers will react on an opportunity basis when they receive
information about a specific individual.2' Here we have actual disease
in other family members that may have generated claims. 2 The insurer
insists on testing - the alternative is policy cancellation. When the couple
receive the bad test results, the company terminates them based on the
"pre-existing condition."
One assumes that the terminated policy is health insurance. It seems
unlikely that a life insurer would try to justify termination, even
during the contestable period, since there was no misrepresentation. In
some states a life insurer might try to rely on a "good-health" clause,
but in most states that approach would be a loser - the life insured is
not affected by the disease, and, in states that apply a subjective
standard, the insured did not know of the condition when the policy was
issued.
One also assumes that this is private health insurance, not insurance
provided by a self-insured employer. If this is the case, the insurance
20 Carol Lee, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic
Discrimination by the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REv. 189, 209
(1993).
21 Orthmann, supra note 4, at 132. The American Society of Human
Genetics ("ASHG") Ad Hoe Committee on Insurance Issues in Genetic Testing
states that "insurance companies do make decisions based on genetic information
and preexisting conditions, even if they do not require genetic testing of
insurance applicants," and that this could "affect the willingness of individuals
to be tested and to obtain timely treatment." Id. Orthmann also mentions the
Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance, appointed by the Working
Group on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues ("ELSr) (funded by the National
Institutes of Health and the U.S. Department of Energy), which opines that it is
"practically impossible and morally indefensible to distinguish genetic from
nongenetic disease risk" and that "risk underwriting should not determine access
to health care." Id. The ABA has also formed a Task Force on the Law of
Reproductive and Genetic Technology. See ABA Unit to Study Genetic
Technology, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1990, at 3.
22 For a discussion of the claims process as a source of genetic information,
see Dee Lord, Something in the Genes: EEOC Takes Steps to Forestall
Discrimination for Predisposition to Illness, A.B.A. L, Apr. 1996, at 86; Mark
A. Rothstein, Genetic Testing, Jobs, and Insurance; What Public Policy Issues
Should Reformers Consider?, EMPLOYMENT TESTING - L. & POL'Y REP., Feb.
1995, at 17, 19-22 [hereinafter Rothstein, Genetic Testing].
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carrier will be regulated under state law which may restrict what the
insurance carrier can and cannot do.
What might state legislators do about the use of genetic tests by
insurance companies? A state might: ban, or place a moratorium on,
genetic testing for insurance purposes; permit only certain validated
(highly predictive) tests to be used; recognize privacy rights of the person
tested in order to keep information out of the hands of insurers; ban the
use of genetic information in insurance determinations, or greatly limit
the use of such information; or, alternatively, expressly permit insurers
to develop and use genetic information. At the present time, insurers
probably have little or no incentive to get into testing - so long as other
insurers are not into it. On the other hand, there are plenty of articles
announcing that the sky is falling.23
A handful of states have passed some type of genetic testing law.24
The authors' home state of Kentucky has not addressed genetic testing
and discrimination directly, but the legislature has adopted insurance
reforms which are intended to make insurance available to persons with
pre-existing conditions.2" Pressure is building for the modification or
repeal of much of this reform legislation now that folks have assessed the
cost and determined who is going to pay the bill.26 National health care
would presumably "solve" much of the problem. There have also been
some proposals for federal legislation on genetic information." One
suspects that the public will become more sensitive to "genetic discrimi-
" For some of these articles, see the SelectedBibliography, infra at pp. 695-
96.
24 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West Supp. 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1
to H:6 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.42, 3901.49, 3901.50 (Anderson
Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4
(Michie Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1995).
' See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A- 110 (1996) (prohibiting denial of
coverage based on pre-existing condition).
26 See, e.g., Robert T. Garrett, All Aboard Insurance "Reform" Special,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 2, 1997, at Dl (detailing testimony
of Kentucky Insurance Commissioner George Nichols I before the Kentucky
legislature). The legislature has already repealed key provisions of the 1994
insurance reforms that required "community rating" and now allows eligible
insurers to employ "experiencerating." See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.18-050
(1996).
27 See, e.g., The Health Security Act, S. 2357, introduced by then-Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine) on Aug. 4, 1994.
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nation" when more is learned about the genetic contributions to more
common ailments, such as cancer and heart disease, that affect greater
numbers of the body politic.28
Problem #3
Esau decides to reapply for a job with the local police force. While
Town will not provide life and health insurance because of Esau's genetic
make-up, the salary is attractive.
When Esau's physician, Dr. Luke, learns that Esau will be taking the
job, he is concerned. When Esau and his wife had blood drawn for the
CF testing, the laboratory misread the request and performed a "genetic
screen" - a series of tests for the presence of several deleterious genes
in addition to the CF genes. Esau learned that he has the Huntington's
disease ("HD") gene. Dr. Luke provided thorough counseling to Esau on
the implications of the test results, but Esau insisted that Dr. Luke not
inform Mahalath of the results. Now, Dr. Luke not only believes that
Esau's wife should be informed of the result, but also believes that for
reasons of public safety the Chief of Police should also be informed. Dr.
Luke keeps trying to persuade Esau to disclose, but by the time he gets
through to Esau, Esau learns that his wife is pregnant. Esau becomes
suicidal.
Comments
How did the Town authorities find out about the applicant's CF
carrier status? Perhaps they heard it through the "grapevine."29 In any
28 As an aside, let us note that CF has been held to be a "disability" under
the ADA. Employment discrimination comes into the picture in Problem #3.
However, as the discussion of that Problem indicates, section 501(c)(1) of the
ADA allows insurers to continue current underwriting practices. This means that
in the absence of contrary state law, insurers can exclude pre-existing conditions,
limit coverage, or increase premium charges for certain conditions. Emery v.
Caravan of Dreams, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 640, 642-43 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (stating
that plaintiff who has CF is "a person with a disability" as defined under the
ADA).
29 See Lord, supra note 22, at 86 (employers may receive information
through the voluntary disclosures of an employee, an "examination required by
the employer, in the course of processing insurance claims or through 'the
grapevine').
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event, this problem provides us with an opportunity to review the possible
application of the ADA.
The first thing we might ask is whether the ADA permits the
employer Town to deny Esau life and health insurance based on his
"genetic make-up." The legislative history of the ADA states that an
employer "may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an
individual based on the person's diagnosis or disability."3 So long as
health insurance is made available to other employees, it must be offered
to Esau. But, it has been argued that the employer may be able to
discriminate against certain disabilities,3 as opposed to individuals with
disabilities, by excluding or restricting coverage for medical services
associated with a particular disability.32 For example, the employer's
plan could exclude from coverage any treatment for HD.3 Apparently
the Problem assumes that the Town is denying Esau any life and health
insurance because of his (and his wife's) CF carrier status, 4 either
because the employer believes, erroneously, that they are at risk of
developing the disease, or because the employer does not want to cover
a CF affected child the couple might have in the future. This may be a
violation of the ADA. 5
Unless the employer is self-insured (in which case the Employee
Retirement Income Act ("ERISA")36 preempts state law 37), state law
30 SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 29
(1989).
3' But see Lord, supra note 22, at 86 ("The agency [EEOC] has not
indicated whether an illness resulting from a genetic predisposition may be
excluded from insurance coverage as a pre-existing condition.").
32 See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 HOus. L. REv. 23, 79-80, 82 (1992)
[hereinafter Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment]. Rothstein says
that the employer's plan could exclude or restrict coverage for dialysis, so long
as an otherwise qualified employee with adult polycyclic kidney disease is given
the same health insurance that every other employee gets.
31 Id. at 82. But what does "treatment for HD" mean?
" CF has been held to be a disability under the ADA. Emery v. Caravan of
Dreams, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 640, 642-43 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that plaintiff,
who has CF, is "a person with a disability" as defined under ADA section 3 (42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994))).
" See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 773-
78 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (discussing EEOC Guidelines in this context).
36 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
31 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (interpreting
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might mandate that certain coverages be provided for certain disorders.
At this point in our discussions, there is little point in dwelling on this
possibility, which has already been discussed under Problem 2.
Will an unaffected carrier of a recessive disorder, or an X-linked
disorder, be covered under the ADA if he is discriminated against
because he and his spouse are at risk of producing a CF offspring?
Discrimination includes "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or
benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an
individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association." '38 One assumes that the words "relationship"
and "association" mean existing and not future "relationships" and
"associations." Esau and his wife do not have a CF child yet.
The ADA itself is silent when it comes to genetics; but at the time
that the ADA was passed, Representative Henry Waxman (D-California)
argued that:
an employer [cannot] discriminate against a carrier of a disease-
associated gene because such individual may be at higher risk of having
a child with a genetic disease, whose care would increase costs for the
parent's employer... If the possibility of such increased costs were
allowed to justify discrimination in employment, a huge loophole would
be created in the protections of the ADA.3 9
"Legislative history" like this tends to take on a life of its own.
Again, one concludes that the employer will have to offer Esau the
insurance that it offers its other employees; but the employer may be able
to exclude coverage for dependents, and may be able to exclude or cap
coverage for certain treatments or services associated with CF.40
ERISA's savings clause (ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)) and
deemer clause (ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994)) as
exempting self-funded plans from state regulation).
38 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994) (emphasis added); see Rothstein, Genetic
Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 47-50 (discussing three theories
related to discrimination of employees who may have affected offspring); Arpiar
Saunders, Jr. & Bennett B. Mortell, Genetic Testing - Genetic Discrimination:
State and Federal Statutes Provide Possible Remedies, N.H. B.J., Dec. 1995, at
23, 30 (discussing unaffected carriers of recessive and X-linked disorders).
39 136 CONG. REc. H4614, H4627 (1990).
" See Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at
82 ("An employee for a self-insured company who had a child with... cystic
fibrosis could suddenly lose all dependent coverage."). Again, the reader is
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For the sake of discussing the ADA, let's address another question
that the Problem skirts. The Problem assumes that Town is willing to hire
Esau. Would Esau be covered by the ADA if Town refused to hire him
because of his CF carrier status? A not altogether intuitive argument for
the application of the ADA would be that Esau, in fact, suffers a current
impairment because of a substantial limitation of a major life activity -
procreation. This would mean that he is "a person with a disability" under
the ADA.4'
Others have argued that Esau also should be covered under another
of the ADA's definitions of "disability" - that the employer "regards
him as disabled," even though he is not.42 In 1995, the EEOC was
finally lobbied into accepting this position, and the agency has incorporat-
ed this interpretation of the statute into a new Compliance Manual.4
The EEOC takes the position that people who are excluded from
employment because of perceived future health care risks are "regarded
as" disabled." This would apply to perceived genetic predispositions.
The new Compliance Manual provides the following example:
directed to Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 780 (Under Section 501(c) of the ADA,
"it may be possible to provide certain coverage exclusions to individuals with
disabilities if the risks of those disabilities so warrant and those risks are treated
like other similar risks not associated with disabilities.").
41 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual"); see Abbot v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D. Me.
1995) (court concluded that HIV substantially limits the "major life activity" of
reproduction), affrd, No. 96-1643, 1997 WL 85096 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 1997); see
also Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 49
(arguing that an unaffected carrier of an X-linked disorder may be a person with
a disability under the ADA since the person would have a "current impairment
because of a substantial limitation of the major life activity of procreation");
Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 28 (discussing the theory that an
unaffected carrier may qualify under the definition of disability due to a
substantial limitation on the ability to procreate).
42 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (expanding the definition of disability to include
an individual who is "being regarded as having such an impairment"); see
Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 47-50
(discussing the theory that an unaffected carrier may qualify under the
definition of disability due to a substantial limitation on the ability to pro-
create).
4 See Lord, supra note 22, at 86; Orthmann, supra note 4, at 133.
4Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 28.
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[The charging party's] genetic profile reveals an increasedsusceptibility
to colon cancer. [The charging party] is currently asymptomatic and
may never in fact develop colon cancer. After making [ ] a conditional
offer of employment, [the employer] learns about [the charging party's]
increased susceptibility to colon cancer. [The employer] then withdraws
the job offer because of concerns about matters such as [the charging
party's] productivity, insurance costs, and attendance. [The employer]
is treating the [charging party] as having an impairment that substantial-
ly limits a major life activity. Accordingly, [the charging party] is
covered by the third part of the definition of "disability."4
The EEOC view may not be accepted by some courts.4 6 But a few
commentators argue that the case of Cook v. Rhode Island Department
of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals4 7 can be cited in this
context to protect persons with asymptomatic genetic conditions who
might be discriminated against because of an employer's fear of future
health care risks and costs.48 Two commentators cite the following case
history as involving violations of the ADA and New Hampshire law:
[A]n asymptomatic 53 year old.., was diagnosed with hemochromato-
sis and was undergoing phlebotomy treatments at three month intervals.
He was accepted into an insurance agent training program. During [an]
interview he disclosed that he was being treated for hemochromatosis
and when asked submitted his latest medical records. A manager of the
45 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902.8(a) (1995).
46 See Robert L. Duston, Courts Will Scrutinize EEOC's Definition of
Disability, EMPLOYMENT TESTING - L. & POL'Y REP., July 1995, at 97, 101-02
("Based on the trend in the courts... to place reasonable limits on the ADA,
it appears likely that the courts will give several aspects of the EEOC's
guidelines close scrutiny."); Gary Taylor, Texas ADA Caseload Puts 5th Circuit
in Major Role: Plaintiffs, EEOC Are Likely to Suffer Setbacks From Court That
Continues to Define Disability Narrowly, Lawyers Say, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995,
at BI (The EEOC's field offices in Texas lead the nation in complaints;
therefore, there is a high probability that the Fifth Circuit will be the first federal
court of appeals to hear these cases; based on past decisions, "the 5th Circuit will
fashion the ADA in ways favorable to employers.").
41 Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps.,
10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding employer liable under the Rehabilitation Act
for refusing to hire a woman who, although "morbidly obese," passed a physical
examination).
48 Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 28.
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company told him his illness may prevent the company from offering
him health insurance benefits. However, he was permitted to enter the
training program. After six weeks, he was told that he would not be
hired because of his diagnosis of hemochromatosis.49
Section 102(d) of the ADA makes illegal all pre-employment medical
examinations and medical inquiries.5" Job applicants may not be asked
about their past, current, or future genetic conditions, the health histories
of family members, or the genetic health conditions of their associates.
But under section 102(d)(3) the employer can require examinations of
conditional job offerees as long as: (1) all conditional offerees in the
same job category are subject to examination, and (2) the information
generated is collected and maintained in separate medical files and treated
as confidential, with exceptions for managers receiving some information
relevant to necessary restrictions or accommodations, and for safety
personnel receiving some information pertinent to possible emergency
treatment.
51
The ADA also permits the employer to require a conditional offeree
to sign a blanket release authorizing the offeree's health care provider to
give the company all requested medical records.52 Oddly enough, the
EEOC interpreted the ADA to allow examinations of conditional offerees
and releases of information to the company to extend to matters that are
not job related, although the use of such information for discriminatory
purposes is prohibited by the law.53 This interpretation invites and
facilitates prohibited discrimination.
Under current law, conditional offerees have no right to know what
medical tests are being performed (e.g., the specific tests being ran on
a blood sample), the results of genetic and other medical tests, or why
a conditional offer of employment was withdrawn. Because this
information is only discoverable, if at all, after the filing of a discrimi-
nation claim, it facilitates surreptitious testing and discriminatory
reliance upon non-job-related criteria in decisionmaking.54
" Id. (citing Joseph S. Alper et al., Genetic Discrimination and Screening
for Hemochromatosis, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 345, 350 (1994)).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2).
51 Id. § 12112(d)(3).
52 Id.
53 EEOC Interim Enforcement Guide, available in Westlaw, EEOC-F-106.
54 Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 58;
see also Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 30 (describing "a major loophole
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The new EEOC position seems to acknowledge that some employers
might act improperly on information obtained from conditional offerees.
The EEOC Compliance Manual gives an example in which a conditional
offeree's genetic profile reveals an increased risk of colon cancer,
whereupon the employer withdraws the job offer. The EEOC notes that
the employer has violated the ADA by the way it used this informa-
tion.
A state law, or a state ADA as interpreted by a state agency, may
provide more protection than the federal ADA and prohibit non-job-
related testing of conditional offerees. For example, New Hampshire's
genetic testing law56 does not allow genetic tests to be part of any
medical entrance exam given to a conditional offeree"
The fact that an applicant is hired does not mean he or she will suffer
no adverse consequences. Section 501(c)(3) of the ADA gives a self-
insured employer (covered by ERISA, so that state insurance regulation
is preempted58) great leeway in classifying risks and structuring cover-
age.59 Furthermore, actuarially-based discrimination, as opposed to
in the ADA"). According to a recent article in the California Lawyer, "[m]any
employers in California today have genetic testing data on their employees
without [the employees'] knowledge." Vince Bielski, Your Boss Wants More
Than Your Blood: Genetic Testing Comes to the Workplace, CAL. LAW., Nov.
1996, at 18. The article also alludes to a recent case in which employee
"privacy" claims under the ADA were held time-barred. Id. (citing Norman-
Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., No. C-95-3220 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12,
1995)).
" See Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 28 (noting that the EEOC
classifies those denied employment because of "future health care risks" as
disabled under the ADA); see also Jeff Barge, Job Interview Can Bring ADA
Liability: Revised EEOC Guidelines Help Employers Avoid Improper Disability
Question, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 34 (reviewing the EEOC's guidelines for
employers that outline appropriate questioning regarding medical conditions
during the interview process); Lord, supra note 22, at 86 (discussing the EEOC's
1995 categorization of genetic susceptibility to disease as a disability under the
ADA).
56 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H (1995).
57 Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 30 (citing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 141-H:3(I)(a) (1995)).
58 See supra note 37.
59 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3) (1994) (The ADA should not be construed to
prohibit "a person or organization... from establishing, sponsoring, observing,
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to state
laws that regulate insurance.").
[VOL. 85
GENETIC TESTING: HYPOTHETICAL CASES
arbitrary or invidious discrimination, is permitted. 60 Up to this point,
most commentators have assumed that an employer and an insurer can
continue to exclude pre-existing conditions, exclude coverage for certain
conditions, charge higher premiums for high risk individuals, impose low
maximum caps on payments for particular treatments, and exclude
dependents.61 In other words, information obtained from genetic
screening or non-job-related medical tests might be used to modify the
employer's self-funded benefits plan, even though the information is not
used to deny employment or withdraw an offer of employment.62
Suggested solutions to this problem include making private group health
insurance "available," or going to a regime of "universal" national health
insurance.
Now let's look at Dr. Luke's dilemma. The lab performed tests that
were not ordered. Is that actionable negligence? There was no consent to
be "screened." Dr. Luke got the word from the lab that Esau has the HD
gene. Can Dr. Luke tell Mahalath? Should Dr. Luke tell her? Can or
should he tell the Chief of Police?
Let's think about this from Esau's perspective. He never asked for the
test or the information. While some people may be relieved to know that
they do not have the HD gene, others will be losers.
"As there is nothing that can be done for the illness, an at-risk person
wishing to be tested for the sake of knowledge and planning alone
gambles for very high stakes: salvation and delivery from a lifetime of
anxiety and ambiguity or a virtual death sentence to be rendered by a
quixotic, but inescapable, executioner."63
60 Again, the reader is directed to Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of
Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 779-80 (E.D. Tex. 1996). In that case, the employer
switched to a new group health insurer that denied any and all coverage to
individuals with AIDS. This meant that Anderson, an employee afflicted with
AIDS, was denied all health insurance, while health insurance was provided to
other employees.
61 See infra Problems 4 & 7.
62 Rothstein, GeneticDiscrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 81-83
(explaining that using genetic screening this way is analogous to currently legal
methods of limiting health care costs); see also Rothstein, Genetic Testing, supra
note 22, at 19-20 (discussing employer incentives to use genetic testing to screen
for heavy users of health care).
63 Becker, supra note 15, at 281 (quoting ConneallyP. Wexler& J. Gusella,
A DNA Polymorphism for Huntington 's Disease Marks the Future, 42 ARCHIVES
OF NEUROLOGY 20, 22 (1985)); see also Orthmann, supra note 4, at 131:
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Suicide is, in fact, a risk associated with knowledge.' Can a physician
eyer justify non-disclosure for the patient's benefit? Can a physician
justify disclosure to a spouse so that the spouse can help in suicide
prevention? Strangely enough, there is also some evidence that winners
can be adversely affected too. In some Huntington's disease families,
persons who have found out that they do not have the Huntington's
mutation have suffered "significant psychological upset."'
The next issue is whether Dr. Luke should disclose Edau's condition
to Mahalath 6 A health care provider can be sued on a variety of
theories for violating confidentiality - for disclosing information to third
parties without the patient's consent.67 These cases usually involve
A positive test for Huntington's disease... predicts that the test subject
will ultimately die of the disease, even if that person has no symptoms
at the time of the testing. In the case of breast cancer, however, carriers
of the BRCA1 gene have an 85 percent chance of contracting cancer in
their lifetime, a risk greater than in the general population but not an
inevitability.... Because a positive test for Huntington's disease is
essentially a death sentence, individuals may understandably choose not
to know whether they carry the gene. With the breast cancer gene, by
contrast, the test indicates only a predisposition for the disease,
individuals can take preventative measures, and chances of a cure are
relatively good.
Id. Still, many carriers of the BRCA1 gene "do not want to know." See Many
Don't Want to Hear Cancer Gene Test Results, HERALD-LEADER (Lexington,
Ky.), June 26, 1996, at A3 (explaining a study that showed less than half of the
people with a family history of breast or ovarian cancer wanted to know if they
carried a gene linked to disease).
64 Becker, supra note 15, at 282 (noting Huntington's disease victims
commit suicide at a higher rate than the population as a whole and those testing
positive for this gene will require "psychological support").
65 Thomson, supra note 16, at 61-62 (using, for an example, a man in his
thirties who, thinking he has the disease, has lived his life "for today" only to
suddenly discover a long life ahead of him for which he has not planned).
66 The arguments for and against disclosure are discussed by Andrews, supra
note 15, at 177-82, and Becker, supra note 15, at 295-98. For a somewhat dated
videotape that presents disclosure issues in the context of HD, see MANAGING
OUR MEDICAL MIRACLES: -TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES (Columbia University) (on
file with University of Kentucky College of Law Library).
67 For a comprehensive article on the physician-patient privilege, see Steve
Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving
with One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1986-87)
(discussing exceptions that limit apparently strong protections afforded medical
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disclosures to employers." However, in one case, MacDonald v.
Klinger,69 the court ruled that a psychiatrist could be liable to a patient
for disclosing "intimate facts" to the patient's wife.7" This case has been
cited as having some possible application to the disclosure of genetic
marker information to a spouse. In our hypothetical, Esau's wife is not
at risk of contracting any disease, as she would be in the case of HIV or
some other communicable disease, but she has a claim to the information
because of the financial and child-bearing implications. So too would a
child have a need and right to know that a parent tested positive for the
marker.7" In the case of Huntington's disease, the case for disclosure to
siblings may not be as persuasive,7" but most would agree that, at some
point at least, Dr. Luke should disclose to Esau's wife, if Esau will not.
In any event, Dr. Luke did not have any time to disclose to Esau's
wife.73
treatment confidentiality).
68 See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 825 (Ala. 1973) (finding
doctor in breach of implied contract of confidentiality because he disclosed a
patient's medical information to the patient's employer).
69 MacDonald v. Klinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
7 Id. at 805 (finding that, compared to the standard for the release of
general medical information to a spouse, a more stringent standard applies
regarding release of psychiatric information).
7" See Pate v. Threlkel, 640 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (holding that lack of privity
did not bar a suit by a patient's child against a physician for failure to warn patient
regarding genetically transferable nature of patient's condition (medullary thyroid
carcinoma); and holding that if, on remand, the court found a duty to warn, the duty
would be discharged by a warning to the patient rather than to the children). But see
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196,207-08 (Alaska 1995) (In an AIDS disclosure case,
the court found MacDonald's recognition of a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality to be pesuasive. However, the court created an exception to
MacDonald: "[W]hen aphysician diagnoses apatient with a fatal, sexually transmitted
disease such as AIDS, the physician's disclosure of this diagnosis to the patient's
spouse is privileged as a matter of law.'); Andrews, supra note 15, at 178-79 (opining
that since genetic defects do not present the same dangers as infectious diseases or
violent behavior, there are less compelling reasons to violate the duty of confidentiali-
ty regarding genetic information).
72 See Andrews, supra note 15, at 180-83 (pointing out that some relatives may
not want to know they might have a serious, incurable disease at an unknown point
in the future); Becker, supra note 15, at 298 (stating a line should be drawn at parent-
child and spousal relationships for disclosure and not extended to siblings).
" For an interesting discussion of the difficulties of bringing "wrongful
birth" and "wrongful life" claims in the context of genetic disease, see Becker,
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Is there a duty to tell the Chief in order to protect the public? In
some circumstances non-disclosure may result in liability if the harm that
could have been prevented is serious enough." The President's Commis-
sion stated that:
A professional's ethical duty of confidentiality to an immediate patient
or client can be overridden only if several conditions are satisfied: (1)
reasonable efforts to elicit voluntary consent to disclosure have failed;
(2) there is a high probability both that the harm will occur if the
information is withheld and that the disclosed information will actually
be used to avert harm; (3) the harm that identifiable individuals would
suffer would be serious; and (4) appropriate precautions are taken to
ensure that only the genetic information needed for diagnosis and/or
treatment of the disease in question is disclosed.75
The authors' reaction is that for now, disclosure to Town should not
be made. The risks do not seem imminent. On the other hand, a real and
substantial risk to third persons may develop at some point. Personality
changes, depression, and schizophrenic-like symptoms may appear before
physical symptoms appear."
Assuming that he is on the job, is Esau protected from discharge if
the Chief finds out? If he tells the Chief, can he be fired? One commenta-
tor, Cheryl L. Becker, reports that an employer .will terminate an
employee who is known to have Huntington's disease.7 7 She argues that
supra note 15, at 784-88.
" For a good discussion, see Alexander Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic
Counseling, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 618, 636 (1979) (discussing liability for
economic injuries caused to the parent of a child born with an undisclosed
genetic disorder). See also Current Opinions of the AMA, Principles of Medical
Ethics, "reprintedin CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 106 (Reno Gorlin
ed., 3d ed. 1994) (requiring physicians conducting genetic testing to provide
information adequate for parents to make informed decisions). For an extended
discussion of disclosure law, with hypotheticals, see Suter, supra note 18, at 1854
(analyzing genetic testing and non-consenting disclosure among family members).
7' THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND
COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 44 (1983).
76 See Becker, supra note 15, at 277-78 (discussing clinical manifestations
of Huntington's disease).
77 Id. at 300 (noting that broad legal latitude is traditionally given private
employers in discharging employees).
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this is unfair when symptoms have not manifested and may not manifest
for some time, but she acknowledges that once symptoms begin to
appear, "the individual should resign, if necessary, to preserve the safety
of his fellow workers as well as his own safety, particularly if he is
involved in mechanical labor."'78 In our scenario, the person afflicted
with the disorder is packing a gun.
Professor Rothstein argues that an individual who carries an
unexpressed late-onset genetic disease like Huntington's should be treated
as a disabled person under the ADA (and under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act79), either as one who is impaired or as one who is
regarded as being impaired."0 He points out that an asymptomatic HIV-
positive individual would be covered. In any event, once the disease is
expressed there will be coverage under the ADA, and we must then turn
to section 103(b) of the ADA, which allows for exclusion of an
individual who poses a "direct threat" to himself or others in the
workplace.8 But Rothstein argues that "[ain employer should not be
able to exclude an individual on the ground that his or her genotype
indicates that he or she will become disabled at some point in the
future."
8 2
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION - INSURANCE
Problem #4
A six year old boy is referred for a neurologic evaluation because of
a seizure. The examining physician notes that the boy has multiple cafe-
au-lait spots, two small subcutaneous neurofibromas, axillary freckling,
mild scoliosis, and Lisch nodules. A diagnosis of neurofibromatosis is
made. The family is referred for genetic counselling and learns that the
boy's father has multiple cafe-au-lait spots and one possible neurofibro-
ma. The father has always been in good health, and has always thought
that the brown spots were "just birth marks." He, too, has neurofibroma-
71 Id. at 301.
79 Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
80 Rothstein, GeneticDiscrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 43-45
(citing the legislative history of the ADA and other disability law precedents).
S 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (establishing as a defense to a charge of discrimination
that disqualification was 'Job-related and consistent with business necessity").
82 Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at 73.
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tosis. The family's private health insurer subsequently drops the family
because of a "pre-existing condition."
Comments
Until recently, insurers were not thought to be charitable institutions.
Historically, we have allowed them to conduct some degree of health-
related screening through medical questionnaires and Some lab testing so
that they might classify risks - only "invidious" discrimination was
considered improper.83 The movement to regulate the use of genetic
information began when some states began to forbid denial of insurance
to persons carrying the sickle cell trait or the Tay-Sachs trait.84 Then,
a few states decided to forbid denials to persons infected with the HIV
virus, or to persons having AIDS."
In 1992, Wisconsin banned the use of genetic testing in insurance,
and there have been similar developments in a few other states.86 A case
can be made that insurers are not hurt by such bans, since all are
similarly affected. The competitive status quo is not threatened. Until
recently, some thought that the problem would be mooted with the
enactment of National Health Insurance or Mandated Employer Funded
83 The writing of articles on "discrimination" in insurance, particularly
"genetic discrimination," is becoming a growth industry. Some of the best
surveys are listed in the Selected Bibliography, infra pp. 695-96.
84 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1982) (covering sickle cell anemia); MD.
CODE ANN., INSURANCE § 223(a)(3) (Supp. 1996) (covering sickle cell anemia,
Tay-Sachs, and other genetic disorders).
85 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5) (Michie 1996). Kentucky
requires that the insurer "shall not exclude coverage for [HIV] .... [The]
insurance contract shall not be canceled or nonrenewed solely because [of an
1IV diagnosis] .... Sexual orientation shall not be used in the underwriting
process ..... Id. Other states have chosen to regulate the insurer's use of HIV
information and to protect the applicant's confidentiality. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-448.01 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 799-799.09
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
86 See supra note 24. For recent federal legislation on genetic information,
portability, and pre-existing conditions, see Health Insurance and Portability Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.). This law
provides that "genetic information shall not be treated as a [preexisting] condition
... in the absence of a diagnosis of the condition related to such information."
Id. (29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(B) (1996)).
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Health Insurance, and elimination of the ERISA exemption for self-
insurers.87
Problem #5
A woman who is affected with adult onset polycystic kidney disease
becomes pregnant. She decides that she wants to know whether her
unborn baby has received the gene for this dominantly-inherited disorder,
and pursues amniocentesis. The woman's BMO considers the request to
pay for this amniocentesis and states, "We will pay for the prenatal
diagnostic procedure ONLY if you agree to terminate the pregnancy in
the event that it shows your fetus to have the gene for adult onset
polycystic kidney disease. Furthermore, if you choose to have a baby
with this gene, we will not provide him/her with medical insurance of any
kind."
Comments
Commentators claim that there have been cases in which insurers
have made such demands! 8 A well-placed tip - to local abortion
protestors - might get the insurer's attention.
Problem #6
A fifty-five year old man is diagnosed with Huntington's disease. The
diagnosis finds its way into a medical information database. The man's
five adult children lose their insurance because of their fifty percent risk
of also being affected.
Comments
We may expect people to pay cash for testing in order to avoid the
risk that insurers or the Medical Information Bureau8 9 will learn of a
genetic condition. Others may decide not to have genetic testing. Clearly,
a case can be made for anonymous genetic counseling and testing.9"
87 See supra note 37.
88 Thomson, supra note 16, at 62 (reporting that in a case involving a fetus
affected by the CF gene, the company was persuaded to back down, and, as a
result, the parents had the child and kept their health insurance).
89 See supra note 19.
90 See, e.g., Maxwell Mehlman et al., The Need for Anonymous Genetic
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Problem #7
A woman has a brother with cystic fibrosis ("CF"). She wants to
know whether or not there is a test that can determine her carrier status.
The local clinic in her small town tells her that they only rarely perform
the test, but that it can be arranged. The woman does not pursue the test.
Later that year, she marries a man who subsequently gets a job at a local
factory. The factory uses the small town's clinic as its health care
provider. A few days after the man's employment, the factory's insurance
company calls the woman to find out if she is the lady who previously
consulted the clinic about CF testing. She says that she did because her
brother has CF. The company says that before it can provide her husband
and his family with health insurance, their carrier status must be resolved.
They must be tested, or insurance will not be provided.
Comments
A person who has CF is a person with a "disability" under the
ADA,9  since he or she is "substantially impaired in the major life
activity of breathing."92 However, in the Problem, neither the woman
nor her husband has the disease. Assuming that they can meet one of
the definitions of "disability"93 they may have a case against the
employer for discrimination, since the employer appears to be denying
the couple any and all insurance, while providing it to other employ-
ees.94 One assumes that this woman could sue the clinic for breach of
confidence.95
Counseling and Testing, 58 AM. J. HuM. GENEnTCS 393,393-94(1996) (advocat-
ing assignment of numeric codes to all genetic tests to prevent tests from being
obtained by employers or insurance companies).
9' ADA § 3 (42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1994)).
92 See, e.g., Emeryv. Caravan of Dreams, 879 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Tex.
1995) (rejecting claim by person with cystic fibrosis that the owner of a music
venue violated the ADA by allowing smoking in a facility).
93 ADA § 3 (42 U.S.C. § 12102(a) (1994)).
9' See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 779-
80 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (completely denying health coverage is a per se violation
of the ADA by employer, but coverage may be limited under certain circum-
stances).
9' See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (holding that a
doctor has implied contract of confidentiality with a patient). In Anderson, 924
F. Supp. at 763, an HIV infected patient began seeing a private doctor for the
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GENETIC DISCRIMINATION - EMPLOYMENT
Problem #8
A young man graduates from the police academy and is offered a
position in a small midwestem town. The town's police department soon
learns that his family has a history of Huntington's disease ("HD"). The
town states that the job offer is now contingent upon his being tested for
the presence of the HD gene. If he refuses to be tested, he will not be
hired.
Comments
We will assume the young man is presently asymptomatic, so that we
are dealing with a case of unexpressed late-onset genetic, disease. Some
have argued that the young man is already a person with a disability.
This argument actually has some support. See, for example, Abbott v.
Bragdon,96 which held that a person with asymptomatic HIV was
covered by the ADA because the condition substantially limited one of
her major life activities - reproduction.97 Commentators argue that this
HIV situation is analogous to the HD scenario, since there is no cure for
HD and since people with the disease are counseled not to have children
because any child would have a fifty percent chance of inheriting HD.9'
Of course, the Problem also presents a case in which the individual is
"regarded as" impaired under the ADA99 and the EEOC Compliance
Manual,"'° so the argument that he is already impaired may not be as
important as it used to be.
Can an employer make an unconditional offer, and then take it back
and condition it on testing? Assuming that the young man can be required
to take the test as a conditional offeree, is the use of the test permitted as
condition, paying out of his own pocket so that he would not alert his company's
health insurer. Later, after he had been diagnosed as having AIDS, his private
doctor mistakenly sent a bill to the group carrier. The issue of confidentiality was
not discussed in the case.
96 Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), affid, No. 96-1643,
1997 WL 85096 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 1997).
97 Id. at 585-87 (holding that refusing to treat a patient infected with LIYV
violates ADA despite legitimate concerns about virus transmission).
98 See Saunders & Mortell, supra note 38, at 28.
99 ADA § 3 (42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (1994)).
"0 EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 45, § 902.8(a).
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being "job-related?" Professor Rothstein argues that this scenario should
be covered by the ADA.'' The EEOC Compliance Manual agrees." 2
Problem #9
Jane applies for a job with XYZ Company which makes her an offer
of employment conditioned on an employment entrance examination
which, among other things, involves drawing blood. Jane is not told why
her blood is being drawn, except that it is "protocol" and that no one is
allowed to reveal what tests are being done on the blood. Jane really
needs this job and does not argue. DNA testing performed on Jane's
blood indicates that she is a carrier of the gene for Duchenne's muscular
dystrophy. Jane is not informed of the results. Rather, she merely receives
a letter in the mail indicating that the job offer has been withdrawn.
Comments
This is a classic case presenting an unaffected carrier of an X-linked
disorder. Rothstein argues that this type of discrimination will occur
because of the EEOC's position on the testing of conditional offer-
ees. 3 How many tested persons will figure out what is going on? An
inference of health-based discrimination does not necessarily arise, and
there may be other justifications advanced by the employer. Some may
be legitimate and some may be pretextual - smoke screens.
Problem #10
A small, isolated town in Eastern Kentucky - Borough - with a
population of about one thousand depends, almost entirely on local coal
mines for employment. It is common knowledge that an inordinate
number of people from Borough have died at an early age from lung
disease. The disorder they have is called alpha-l-antitrypsin deficiency.
10 See Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at
54-61 (noting that although genetic testing may not be used to deny employment
under the ADA, the mere fact that non-job-related genetic testing is allowed
threatens privacy and dignity of individuals contrary to intent of ADA).
102 These same issues were discussed in the Comments to Problem 3, see
supra notes 29-82 and accompanying text.
103 See Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment, supra note 32, at
55-56.
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Affected individuals are highly susceptible to lung damage from
pollution, tobacco smoke, coal dust, etc. Local coal companies have
posted the following requirement for employment: "Any person from
Borough must have genetic testing for alpha-l-antitrypsin deficiency. If
affected, employment will not be offered." A group of people from
Borough want to file a suit claiming discrimination.
Comments
Here we have a case of screening conducted out of concern for future
occupational illness, or rather the costs of future occupational illness. This
exact scenario is not addressed in the ADA or EEOC regulations.
Professor Rothstein argues that individuals with a genetic predisposition
should be covered by the ADA, since they are "regarded as disabled" by
the employer.' The EEOC recently agreed with this analysis.'05
Presumably, the next question under the ADA is whether an individual
can be excluded by an employer for medical reasons because of a "direct
threat" to that individual.' 6 Can an employer justify an exclusion on
that basis? The harm is not imminent, and screening based on concern
about an illness in the distant future may be hard to support. How much
difference does the condition make? What are the absolute and the
relative risks? For example, may an employer exclude an applicant for
employment because his risk of suffering a lung impairment is eighty-five
percent if other miners have an eighty percent chance of suffering the
same impairment?" 7 What if everyone were to use protective equip-
ment? Does available or obtainable protective equipment work? Would
it not make more sense to require the employer to focus on making the
workplace safe for everyone?l'0
4 Id. at 46, 73.
,0- EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 45, § 902.8(a).
106 See ADA § 103(b) (42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (as expanded by 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (1991))) ("An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that
an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of himself/herself or
others.").
107 MARK ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 125 (1984).
108 See Orthmann, supra note 4, at 131 ("[E]mployers might use screening
as an alternativeto preventing worker exposure to carcinogens."); Gail Appelson,
Genes and Jobs: Tests Raise Legal and Ethical Questions, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1982,
at 1061, 1063 (Union officials complain that "'[i]t's part of the whole effort to
blame the victim,"' and "companies are violating workers' privacy by exchang-
ing test results with other companies and 'blackballing' applicants. 'It will create
1996-97]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A similar case is discussed by Professor Elsas.' °9 That case in-
volved a cotton ginning plant that wanted to establish a screening test
for alpha-1-antitrypsin. The geneticists hired to investigate told the
employer to "forget it" because the testing would be coercive and would
benefit no one but the employer."' The lung disease, bagassosis, the
company said that it was worried about was probably caused by mold.
The company was told to clean up the mills, paying particular atten-
tion to moldy compost that was being spread through the air condition-
kng.1
11
On another note, researchers at the University of Kentucky's Markey
Cancer Center have announced their interest in screening and studying
small "homogeneous groups" in Eastern Kentucky, with a view to
following BRCA1 mutations associated with breast and ovarian cancers.
However, the tests are expensive, around $1600, and researchers are not
certain how to predict risks from the results."'
Problem #11
In the year 2010, as a result of the Human Genome project ("HGP"),
testing for practically all genetic disorders and traits is possible. In 1999,
Congress passed a law stating that all employers are required to provide
insurance to all employees, and the government will provide National
Health Care Insurance for the rest of the population. As a result, all
newborns are screened and a genetic risk profile ("GRP") is determined
based on the genetic risk factors identified. Each newborn is assigned a
number reflecting his or her genetic risk. A high number is undesirable
and reflects a higher risk than a lower number.
an army of untouchables."'); see also Duston, supra note 46, at 101-02
(discussing how courts will evaluate the EEOC's interpretation of "disability"
under the ADA).
109 Elsas, supra note 14, at 849.
SId. (noting responsibility of physician extends to employees as well as to
employer).
"1 Id.
12 See Eastern Kentucky May Be Genetic Test Site, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 1, 1995, at A15 (noting Eastern Kentucky may provide
a good location to study how the "BRCAI" genetic mutation can be common
within distinct population with a similar background); see also Proceedings of
the Workshop on InheritedBreast Cancer in Jewish Women: Ethical, Legal, and
Social Implications, Apr. 26, 1996, at the Case Western Reserve University Law
and Medicine Center.
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In the year 2036, Bob and Tom apply for the same job. They are
both equally qualified for the job, but Bob's GRP is 15.57 and Tom's is
73.32. Bob is offered the job.
The same year, William and Robert run for President. Early polling
suggests that it will be a close race. One month before the election,
William's campaign manager releases William's certified GRP. It is 7.38.
Robert refuses to release his GRP. William goes on to win by a landslide.
Comments
Mass screening would be extremely expensive, especially if it were
combined with counseling."3 On the other hand, the military is consid-
ering the development of a "genetic dog tag" which will be expensive,
and questions have been raised about how long the information will be
kept by the government and who will have access to it."' There have
been several calls for federal "privacy" legislation."5
GENETIC DISCRIMINATIoN - MISCELLANEOUS
Problem #12
It is 2010. Jacob and Rachel are married and have congenital
deafness. They want a child who is also deaf, and will abort any fetus
who is genetically determined to have hearing." 6 Prenatal diagnosis is
"' See Hanson, supra note 13, at 45 (stating that mass screening for genetic
defects would explode as a component of health care spending with limited
associated benefits).
"4 Id. at 47-48. If the justification of the program is the need to identify the
bodies of servicepersons, then critics have rightly suggested that servicepersons
be given the right to de-register when they leave the service. The problem of
compulsory participation has come to a head according to headlines out of
Honolulu: Marines FaceJailfor Not GivingDNA, HERALD-LEADER (Lexington,
Ky.), Apr. 16, 1996, at A3. The Marines are being court-martialed for failing to
give blood samples to the DNA registry. The purpose of these samples is to aid
in the identification of remains. It appears that the Marines will be supported by
medical ethicists, critics of the insurance industry, and the ACLU. Id.
"' See Rorie Sherman, Employer Use of Genetic Tests to be Restricted?,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 15 (discussing the Human Genome Privacy Act
introduced by Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Michigan)); Orthmann, supra note 4,
at 133 (alluding to model federal legislation entitled the Genetic Privacy Act that
was drafted at the Boston University School of Public Health).
16 Some deaf couples have stated that they would feel threatened by having
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available, and the HGP has made it possible to test for this type of
deafness. A pregnancy occurs, and prenatal testing indicates a fetus with
normal hearing. The couple states that they will continue the pregnancy
only if a recently-developed surgical procedure is performed in utero
causing the fetus to lose his hearing. If the surgery is not performed,
Rachel will terminate the pregnancy.
Comments
This is as fraught with ethical implications as abortion for sex
selection, but it is a good note to end on! Testing is available in the U.S.
for sex selection."7 It is a Brave New World after all.
a hearing child. For analysis of the use of genetic testing to produce a child with
a disability, see JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 171 (1994) (referring to the use of genetic
tests to select for genetic defects as "intentional diminishment").
117 See Wertz, supra note 5, at 1430. Wertz states that "[m]edical profession-
als in the United States appear increasingly willing to perform prenatal diagnosis
for those making such [sex selection] requests," and that her "1993-94 survey of
over 2600 geneticists in thirty-seven nations shows a clear trend toward greater
willingness to perform prenatal diagnosis for sex selection... ." Id. at 1430-31.
She also notes that "due to inadequate care afforded to female children and to
women, an estimated sixty million to one hundred million women are 'missing'
from the world's population, including twenty-million in China and twenty-three
million in India." Id. at 1432.
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